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Abstract
We discuss the model theory of two popular
approaches to lexical semantics and their rela-
tion to transcendental logic.
1 Introduction
Recent advances in formal and computational lin-
guistics have brought forth two classes of theories,
algebraic conceptual representation (ACR) and con-
tinuous vector space (CVS) models. Together with
Montague grammar (MG) and its lineal descendants
(Discourse Representation Theory, Dynamic Predi-
cate Logic, etc.) we now have three broad families
of semantic theories competing in the same space.
MG and related theories fit well with most versions
of transformational and post-transformational gram-
mar and retain a strong presence in theoretical lin-
guistics, but have long been abandoned in computa-
tional work as too brittle (Landsbergen, 1982). As
we have argued elsewhere, MG-like theories fail not
just as performance grammar but, perhaps more sur-
prisingly, on competence grounds as well (Kornai et
al., 2015). Nevertheless, MG will be our starting
point, as it is familiar to virtually all linguists.
From an abstract point of view we should dis-
tinguish between a framework for compositional-
ity and a commitment to a particular brand of se-
mantics. While we still want to uphold the idea
of compositionality, we are less enthusiastic about
the dominance of standard first order models, even
if suitably intensionalized, in explaining or repre-
senting meanings. Luckily, other choices can be
made, though they come with a different concep-
tion of meaning. The main difference between ACR,
CVS, and the standard MG treatment is in fact the
choice of model structures: both ACR and CVS
aim at modeling ‘concepts in the head’ rather than
‘things in the world’, and thus clash strongly with
the ostensive anti-psychologism of MG. How can
we make sense of such theories after Lewis (1970)
without being attacked for promulgating yet another
version of markerese? The answer proposed in this
paper is that we divest model theory from the nar-
row meaning it has acquired in linguistics, as being
about formulas in some first- or higher-order calcu-
lus, and interpret natural language expressions ei-
ther directly in the models, the original approach
of Montague (1970a), or through some convenient
knowledge representation language, still composed
of formulas, but without the standard logical bag-
gage. The main novelty is that the formulas them-
selves will be very close to the models, though not
quite like in Herbrand models for reasons that will
become clear as we develop the theory.
Section 2 provides a brief justification for the en-
terprise, and sketches as much of ACR and CVS as
we will need for Section 3, where essential proper-
ties of their models are discussed. Our focus will
be on CVS, and we shall discuss the challenge of
compositionality, which appears to be nontrivial for
CVSs. ACR graphs are simple discrete structures,
very attractive for representing meaning (indeed,
they have a long history in Knowledge Representa-
tion), but more clumsy for syntax. CVS representa-
tions, finite dimensional vectors over R, are primar-
ily about distribution (syntactic cooccurrence), and
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meaning, especially the linear structures that encode
analogy such as king:queen = man:woman will arise
in them chiefly as a result of probabilistic regulari-
ties (Arora et al., 2015). We take the view that CVS
models ‘concepts in the head’ and to understand how
these can be similar across speakers we need to in-
voke ‘concepts in the world’ as described by ACR.
Section 4 discusses the challenge posed by chang-
ing to mentalist semantics. If meanings are in the
head, we are losing, or so it appears, the objectivity
of meanings. However, we think that this is not so.
Instead, our working hypothesis of this paper is what
we call ‘One Reality’: meanings describe a common
reality so that anything that is true of the world must
be compatible with anything else that is true. The
section explores some immediate consequences of
this hypothesis. We close with some speculative re-
marks in Section 5.
2 Out with the old, in with the new
Classical MG (Montague, 1970b; Montague, 1973)
provides a translation from expressions of natural
language into (higher order) predicate logic. Pred-
icate logic itself is just a technical device, a lan-
guage, to represent the actual meanings, which are
thought to reside in models. Thus, already at the
inception, formal semantics differentiated two kinds
of “semantics”: the abstract level, consisting of lin-
guistic objects (here: expressions of simple type the-
ory), and the concrete level, represented by a model.
In what is to follow we shall investigate the effects
of making two changes. One is to replace the simple
type theory by radically different kinds of semantics,
and the second to uphold the idea that the semantics
is not just about some model, but about reality, and
as such cannot be arbitrarily fixed.
Let us briefly recall how a Montague-style seman-
tics looks like. Following (Kracht, 2011), a gram-
mar consists of a finite signature (F,Ω) of function
symbols (Ω : F → N assigns an arity to the sym-
bols), together with an interpretation that interprets
each function symbol f as an Ω(f)-ary function on
the space of signs, (see also Hodges 2001). Further
down we shall meet only two kinds of functions:
constants, where Ω(f) = 0, representing the lex-
icon, and binary functions (Ω(f) = 2), represent-
ing syntax proper.) We may take as signs either
pairs (w,m), where w is a word over the alphabet
and m its meaning; or we may take them as triples
(w, c,m), where c is an additional component, the
category (Kracht, 2003). In the best of all cases,
the action of f on the signs is independent in each
of the components. The independence of the string
action from the meanings is exactly Chomsky’s fa-
mous principle of the autonomy of syntax while the
independence of the meaning action from the words
is the principle of compositionality. If these are
granted, each function symbol f then gives rise to a
pair of functions (f ε, fµ), where f ε is an Ω(f)-ary
function on strings and fµ an Ω(f)-ary function on
meanings. Further, given any constant term t over
this signature, “unfolding” (the homomorphic oper-
ation denoted by ♠) it into a sign means
(f(t1, t2))
♠ = (f ε(t♠1 , t
♠
2 ), f
µ(t♠1 , f
♠
2 ))
and for 0-ary f , simply f♠() = (f ε(), fµ()). Omit-
ting obvious brackets this is simply f♠ = (f ε, fµ).
A constant therefore is defined by its two compo-
nents, the string (f ε) and the meaning (fµ).
Effectively, we can now view not only the terms
as elements of an algebra (called the term algebra),
but also the strings together with the functions f ε
(f ∈ F ), and the meanings together with the func-
tions fµ (f ∈ F ). Expressions and meanings thus
become algebras, and there are then two homomor-
phisms from the algebra of terms: one to the alge-
bra of strings and another to the algebra of mean-
ings. Both algebras may have additional functions,
of course. This will play a role in the case of CVS
models which have the structure of a vector space,
whose natural operations enter into the definition of
the functions.
When we say ‘out with the old’ we will not dwell
much on the inadequacies of the standard MG treat-
ment, except to summarize some of the well known
issues. Technical inadequacies, ranging from nar-
row issues of proposing invalid readings and miss-
ing valid ones to more far-reaching problems as pro-
vided e.g. by hyperintensionals (Pollard, 2008) are
not viewed as fatal – to the contrary, these provide
the impetus for further developments. A more gen-
eral, systemic issue however is the chronic lack of
coverage. The problem is not so much that the pio-
neering examples from Every man loves a woman
such that she loves him to John seeks a unicorn
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and Mary seeks it could hardly be regarded exam-
ples of ordinary language as the alarming lack of
progress in this regard – forty years have passed,
and best of breed implementations such as CatLog
(Morrill, 2011) and grammar fragments such as Ja-
cobson (2014) still cover only a few dozen construc-
tions. An equally deep, and perhaps even more crit-
ical, problem is the continuing disregard for infor-
mation. No matter how we look at it, well over 80%
of the information carried by sentences comes from
the lexicon, with only 10-15% coming from com-
positional structure (Kornai, 2010). By putting lexi-
cal semantics front and center, we will address both
these issues.
One of the biggest challenges for MG is the dis-
ambiguation. In the standard picture, readings cor-
respond to parse terms. Thus, a stringw has as many
readings as there are parse terms t such that tε = w.
Unfortunately, scholars in the MG tradition have
spent little effort on building grammatical models of
natural language that could serve as a starting point
of disambiguation in the sense Montague urged, and
the disambiguation in terms of parse terms is more
a promissory note than an actual algorithm. This
is particularly clear as we come to effects of con-
textuality, restated from Frege by Janssen (2001) as
follows: ‘Never ask for the meaning of a word in
isolation, but only in the context of a sentence’.
In other words, what a particular word means in
a sentence can be determined only by looking at the
context, since the context selects a particular read-
ing. The standard MG picture handles lexical am-
biguity by invoking separate lexical entries (that is,
0-ary function symbols) for each sense a word may
have, e.g. for pen1 ‘writing instrument’ and pen2
‘enclosed area for children or cattle’. When we say
The box is in the pen we clearly have pen2 in mind,
and when we say The pen is in the box it is pen1.
Strict adherence to MG orthodoxy demands that we
bite the bullet and claim that the false readings are
actually wonderful to have, since a smaller playpen
could really be delivered in a box, and even for a
large cattle pen an artist like Christo could always
come by and box up the entire thing. Yet some-
how the claim rings false, both from a cognitive
standpoint, since the odd readings do not even en-
ter our mind when we hear the sentence unless we
are specifically primed, and from the computational
standpoint, since it is common knowledge (at least
since Bar-Hillel (1960) where the box/pen example
originates) that the bulk of the effort e.g. in machine
translation is to disambiguate the word meanings.
According to Bar-Hillel, the average English word is
3-way ambiguous, so a sentence of length 15 will re-
quire over 14 million disambiguated options. How-
ever much our computational resources have grown
since 1960, and they have actually grown more than
14 million-fold, this is still unrealistic.
Another part of the theory that remained, for the
past forty years, largely unspecified, is the mapping
g that would ground elements of the mathematical
model structure in reality (as opposed to the ‘valu-
ation’ that is built into the model structure). For a
mathematical theory, such as the theory of groups,
there is no need for g as such in that there are no
groups “in the world”. All objects in mathematics
that have group structure (e.g. the symmetries of
some geometrical figure) can be built directly from
sets (since a symmetry is a function, and functions
are sets), so restricting attention to model structures
that are sets is entirely sufficient for doing mathe-
matics. Here we must give some thought to what
we consider ‘ground truth’, a notion that is already
problematic for proper names without referents such
as Zeus.
The abstract structure outlined above does not re-
quire the meanings to be anything in particular. All
that is required is that we come up with an algebra
of meanings into which the terms can be mapped so
that certain equations, the meaning postulates, come
out true. Our exercise consists therefore in throw-
ing out the old semantics and bringing in the new,
here CVS and ACR, and see where this leads us.
When we say ‘in with the new’ this is something
of an exaggeration – both ACR and CVS theories
go back to the late 1960s and early 1970s, and are
thus as old as MG, except both suffered a long hiatus
during the ‘AI Winter’. Algebraic conceptual rep-
resentation (ACR) begins with Quillian (1969) and
Schank (1972), who put the emphasis on associa-
tions (graph edges) between concepts (graph nodes).
Quillian only used one kind of (directed) edge, while
Schank used several – the ensuing proliferation of
link types is famously criticized in Woods (1975).
For a summary of the early work see Findler (1979),
for modern treatments see Sowa (2000), Banarescu
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et al. (2013).
Continuous vector space (CVS) representation
was first developed by (Osgood et al., 1975), whose
interest is also with association between concepts,
which they directly measured by asking informants
to rate the strength of the association on a 7-point
scale. From such data, Osgood and his cowork-
ers proceeded by data reduction via principal com-
ponent analysis (PCA), obtaining vectors that were
viewed as directions in semantic space. In the mod-
ern version, which has taken computational linguis-
tics by storm in the past five years, the associations
are mined from cooccurrence data in large corpora
(Schu¨tze, 1993), but data reduction by PCA or sim-
ilar techniques is still a central part of establishing
the mapping from the vocabulary V to Rn.
Importantly, both ACR and CVS are essentially
type free. They assume that the representation of the
whole utterance is not any different from the repre-
sentation of the constituents, down to the lexical en-
tries: in ACR every meaning is a graph, and in CVS
a vector. As said above, there are two types of func-
tion symbols. Those of arity 0 constitute the con-
ceptual dictionary. The remaining function symbols
are of arity 2. On the string side they are interpreted
as concatenation, giving rise to a CFG. For ACR,
the meanings of the parts are combined by ordinary
substitution operations, graph rewriting and adjunc-
tion. For CVS, several combination operations have
been proposed, including vector addition (Mitchell
and Lapata, 2008), coordinatewise (weighted) mul-
tiplication (Dinu and Lapata, 2010), function appli-
cation (Coecke et al., 2010) and substitution into re-
current neural nets (Socher et al., 2013). For a sum-
mary, see Baroni (2013). Here we will use ⊗ to de-
note any composition operation, as tensorial prod-
ucts have long been suggested in this area (Smolen-
sky, 1990).
A key point is that ⊗ itself may be parametrized,
more similar to the ‘type-driven’ versions of MG
(Klein and Sag, 1985) than to the classic variant
which has a single composition operation, function
application. Berkeley Construction Grammar (CxG,
see Goldberg 1995) has long urged a full theory of
constructional meanings, and Kracht (2011) makes
clear that languages must employ many, many sim-
ple constructions, if as above compositionality and
autonomy of syntax are assumed.
3 The structure of CVS and ACR model
structures
Recall that the functions f ε and fµ (f ∈ F ) impose
an algebraic structure both on the set of exponents
and the set of meanings, respectively. There may be
additional structure on the meanings, which we may
take advantage of. For example, if meanings are
vectors, we additionally have scalar multiplication
and addition, which can be used in calculations, but
which also have their own semantic relevance. In-
deed, it has been observed by Mikolov et al. (2013)
that in an analogy a : b = c : d we can calculate vd
approximately as va− vb + vc. Or, what is the same,
we expect va − vb = vc − vd.
The currently best performing Context Vector
Grammar (CVG, see Socher et al. 2013) uses what
looks like a single binary function ⊗, however it is
parametrized by part of speech. CVGs work on or-
dered pairs (~v,X) where ~v contributes the seman-
tics, and X is some part of speech category (in-
cluding nonterminals such as NP). In our notation
(~v,X) combines with (~w, Y ) by two square ma-
trices LXY , RXY and a bias ~bXY that depend on
X and Y (but not on ~v or ~w) to yield ~v ⊗ ~w =
tanh(L~v + R~w +~b) (dropping the parts of speech)
where the squishing function tanh is applied coor-
dinatewise.
Since tanh is strictly monotonic, we have x = y
iff tanh(x) = tanh(y), so the last step of squishing
can be ignored in the kind of equational deduction
that we will deal with. As an example, consider the
gram3-comparative task. It is an accident of
English that comparative is sometimes denoted by
the suffix -er and sometimes by the prefix more writ-
ten as a separate word. Ideally, the semantics should
support equations such as
~big ⊗ ~er − ~nice⊗ ~er = ~big − ~nice (1)
or, equivalently,
tanh(L ~big+R~er+~b)−tanh(L ~nice+R~er+~b) =
~big − ~nice
In reality both the matrix and the vector coefficients
are small enough for tanh(x) = x to be a reasonable
approximation, so we have
L ~big − L ~nice = ~big − ~nice (2)
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or, what is the same, (L − I)( ~big − ~nice) = 0 not
just for big and nice but for every pair of adjective
vectors ~u,~v. This is possible only if 〈A〉, the sub-
space generated by the adjectives, is contained in
Ker(L − I). Since L does not even need to be de-
fined outside 〈A〉, and must coincide with I within
〈A〉, the simplest assumption is L = I everywhere.
Now, R and b are fixed for the comparative task, so
R~er+~b is some constant vector ~c on 〈A〉, so that we
finally get
∀~x ∈ 〈A〉 : ~x⊗ ~er = ~x+ ~c (3)
and obviously if (3) holds the analogical require-
ment in (1) is satisfied. The same argument can be
made (with different constant ~c) for every deriva-
tional and inflexional suffix such as the -ly of
the gram1-adjective-to-adverb or the -ing
of the gram5-present-participle Google
task. Further, the same must hold for every case
where a fixed formative is used to derive a higher
constituent, such as PP[from] from a base NP and
a prefix from, or NP from a base N and the prefix
the. Remarkably, just as PP[from] can differ from
PP[by] only by a fixed offset, the difference between
the constant for from and that for by, NP[every] and
NP[some] can also differ only in a fixed offset irre-
spective of what the base N was.
This shows how analogies can help in identify-
ing the functions for certain derivations. However,
more can be achieved. Consider the case of two
synonymous expressions e and e′. Retracing their
respective parses, assuming that the result vectors
are the same we derive further constraints. Con-
sider the mayor’s hat and the hat of the mayor which
should get the same vector assigned compositionally
through two different routes. If ~m and ~h are the vec-
tors for mayor and hat, we have some ~m + ~c1 for
the mayor and ~h + ~c1 for the hat. If the ’s posses-
sive construction is defined by matrices L1, R1 and
bias ~b1, and the of-possessive by L2, R2, ~b2, the fact
that these mean the same will be expressed, again
ignoring the squishing, by
L1(~m+ ~c1) +R1~h+ ~b1
= L2(~h+ ~c1) +R2(~m+ ~c1) + ~b2 (4)
By collecting like terms together, this means
(L1 −R2)~m+ (R1 − L2)~h+ ~c4 = ~0 (5)
for some constant ~c4 and for all noun vectors ~m,~h.
This of course requires L1 = R2, L2 = R1 and
~c4 = 0, meaning that the two constructions differ
only in the order they take the possessor and pos-
sessed arguments. Also, if instead of ((the hat) of
(the mayor)) we had chosen the structure (the (hat
of (the mayor))) the matrices would be the same.
To summarize, all productive derivational and in-
flectional processes will have the output differ from
the input by some constant ~c that depends only on
the construction in question, and the same goes for
all ‘syntactic’ processes such as forming a PP or NP
whose output differs from its input only by the ad-
dition of some fixed grammatical formative, includ-
ing the formation of modal verb complexes (must
go, will eat, . . . ) by a fixed auxiliary. Note that
such processes crosslinguistically often end up in the
morphology, cf. Romanian -ul ‘the’ or Hungarian
-val/vel ‘with’.
An important consequence of what we said so
far is that the effects of fixed formatives, be they
attached morphologically or by a supporting clitic
or full word, are commutative. This explains how
even closely related languages like Finnish and Hun-
garian can have different conventional suffix orders
(e.g. between case endings and possessive endings),
as it takes no effort to rejigger the semantics with
a change of inflection order. Also, a good number
of bracketing paradoxes (Williams, 1981; Spencer,
1988) simply disappear: in light of commutative se-
mantics brackets are not at all called for, and the
‘paradox’ is simply a by-product of an overly de-
tailed (context free) descriptive technique.
The less productive a process, the less compelling
the argument we made above, since it depends on
some identity holding not just for a handful of vec-
tors but for an entire subspace generated by the part
of speech class of the input. For example the mor-
phologically still perceptible relatedness of latinate
prefixes and stems (Aronoff, 1976) as in commit, re-
mit, permit, submit, compel, repel, impel, confer, re-
fer, infer, . . . will hardly allow for computing sep-
arate vectors for con-, re-, . . . on the one hand and
pel, mit, sume, fer, ceive, . . . on the other as we have
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too many unknowns for too few equations. Or con-
sider bath:bathe, sheath:sheathe, wreath:wreathe,
teeth:teethe, safe:save, strife:strive, thief:thieve,
grief:grieve, half:halve, shelf:shelve, serf:serve, ad-
vice:advise, . . . where the relationship between the
noun and the verb is quite transparent, yet the set on
which the rule applies is almost lost among the much
larger set of nouns that can be ‘verbed’ by zero af-
fixation or stress shift alone.
This is not to say that suppletive forms, such as
found in irregular plurals or strong verbs are out-
side the scope of our finding, for clearly if plu-
ral formation is the addition of a single fixed ~c
in all regular cases, ~horses = ~horse + ~c, we
must also have ~oxen = ~ox + ~c since the anal-
ogy horse:horses=ox:oxen is intact. But given their
paucity, derivational forms may still be sensitive to
order of affixation, so that something like the Mirror
Principle (Baker, 1985) may still make sense.
Looking at the 882L andRmatrices (25 by 25 di-
mensions) in the CVG instance available as part of
the Stanford Dependency Parser, we note that over
half (55% for L, 53% for R) of the variance in this
set is explained by the first 25 eigenmatrices, so the
structure is likely considerably simpler than the full
CVG model allows for. We tested this hypothesis
by grammars CVG(k) constructed from the Socher
et al. (2013) CVG(882) by replacing all 882 L and
R matrices by approximations based on the first k
eigenmatrices (middle column of Table 1). The case
k = 1 corresponds to the earlier RNN (Socher et al.,
2011) with a single global ⊗, and gets only 81.0%
on the WSJ task. As we increase the number of co-
efficients kept, we obtain results closer and closer to
the original CVG(882): at k = 100 we are already
within 1% of the full result.
k no I I first
1 81.02
5 82.85 84.59
25 86.88 89.32
50 88.50 90.07
100 89.47 90.24
200 90.08 90.32
882 90.36 90.36
Table 1 Parsing performance as a function of the
number of coefficients kept in ⊗ definitions
As Socher et al. (2013) already observe, the diagonal
of the L (resp. R) matrix is dominant for left- (resp.
right-)headed endocentric constructions, so we also
experimented with keeping only k − 1 of the eigen-
matrices and replacing the kth by I before finding
the best approximations (right column of Table 1).
With this choice of basis, the phenomenon is even
more marked: it is sufficient to keep the top 24 (plus
the coefficient for I) to get within 1% of the original
result.
By limiting k we can limit the actual information
content of ⊗, which would otherwise grow quadrat-
ically in d. Given that the 882 matrix pairs were
already abstracted on the basis of sizeable corpora
(63m words from the Reuters newswire, see Turian
et al. 2010), direct numerical investigation of the
882⊗ operators to detect this simpler structure faces
stability issues. In fact, it is next to impossible to
guess, based strictly on an inspection of the eigen-
matrices, that replacing the least one by I would
be advantageous – for this we need to have a more
model-based strategy, to which we now turn.
We speak about distributions in two main senses:
discrete (class-level) and continuous (item-level).
The distinction is reflected in the notation of gen-
erative grammar as between preterminals and termi-
nals, and in the practice of language modeling as be-
tween states and emissions of Hidden Markov Mod-
els (HMMs). In generative grammar, the class-level
distribution is typically conceived of in 0-1 terms:
either a string of preterminals is part of the language
or it is not – weighted grammars that make finer dis-
tinctions only became popular in the 1980s, decades
after the original work on constituency (Wells, 1947;
Harris, 1951; Chomsky, 1957). The standard (un-
weighted) grammar already captures significant gen-
eralizations such that A+N (adjective followed by
noun) is very likely in English, while N+A is more
likely in French. However, as (Harris, 1951) already
notes,
All elements in a language can be grouped
into classes whose relative occurrence can
be stated exactly. However, for the oc-
currence of a particular member of one
class relative to a particular member of an-
other class, it would be necessary to speak
in terms of probability, based on the fre-
quency of that occurrence in a sample.
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Retrofitting generative rules such as N → AN
achieves very little, in that it is not clear which ad-
jective will go with which noun. As (Kornai, 2011)
noted, HMM transition probabilities tend to stay in a
relatively narrow range of 10−4−10−1 (the low val-
ues typically coming from smoothing) while emis-
sions can span 8-9 orders of magnitude – this is pre-
cisely why n-gram HMMs remain a viable alterna-
tive to PCFGs to this day. CVS models capture a
great deal of the distributional nuances because the
vectors encode not just an estimate of unigram prob-
abilities
log(p(w)) =
1
2d
||~w||2 − logZ ± o(1) (6)
but also a cooccurrence estimate
log p(w,w′) =
1
2d
||~w+ ~w′||2−2 logZ±o(1) (7)
for some fixed Z (Arora et al., 2015). For unigrams,
the GloVe dictionary (Pennington et al., 2014) actu-
ally shows a Pearson correlation of 0.393 with the
Google 1T frequencies and 0.395 with the BNC.
While these are not bad numbers, (especially con-
sidering that G1T and BNC only correlate to 0.882),
clearly a lot more need to be done before (7) be-
comes realistic. Table 2 shows some frequent, rare,
and nonexistent A+N combinations together with
their Google 1T frequency; the right-hand side of
eq. (7); the scalar product of the GloVe word vec-
tors; and their cosine angles.
A-N pair freq (6) rhs 〈, 〉 cos
popular series 95k -3.153 13.95 0.39
popular guidance 127 -3.158 2.80 0.08
popular extent 0 -3.175 6.78 0.23
rapid development 299k -3.137 20.40 0.50
rapid place 182 -3.165 7.88 0.25
rapid percent 0 -3.115 11.30 0.24
private student 134k -3.121 16.79 0.37
rare student 989 -3.133 5.30 0.13
cold student 0 -3.121 4.58 0.10
Table 2 Cooccurrence predictors for frequent, rare,
and nonexistent adjective+noun combinations
Evidently, GloVe captures a great deal of the dis-
tribution, clearly ranking the frequent above the
rare/nonexistent both in unnormalized (scalar prod-
uct) and normalized (cosine) terms, while (7) largely
obscures this. All of these predictors fare badly
when it comes to comparing rare to nonexistent
forms. (Of course Google 1T ‘nonexistence’ only
means ‘below the cutoff’ but here this is as good
as nonexistence since such pairs don’t participate in
the training.) It is reasonable to conclude that em-
beddings model the high- to mid-range of the distri-
bution quite well, but fail on very rare data, which
call for a corrective term in the Arora et al. estimate
in Eq. (7).
Remarkably, word similarity measures based on
definitional similarity do nearly as well on semantic
world similarity tasks as those based on distributions
(Recski and A´cs, 2015). These definitions, common
to ACR models, manifest no distributional similarity
between definiendum and definiens, compare rascal
to a child who behaves badly but whom you still like.
Yet when we compare rascal to imp ‘a child who be-
haves badly, but in a way that is funny’ the similarity
becomes evident: both rascal and imp are defined as
‘children behaving badly’. There are many idiosyn-
cratic traits to these words, for example both little
rascal and little imp are plausible, but ??old imp is
not, even though old rascal is. More often than not,
these differences in distribution have to do with acci-
dents of history rather than any semantic difference
to speak of – this is especially clear on the case of
exact synonyms like twelve and dozen.
Here we simply assume that observable distribu-
tion is the result of two factors: pure syntax, as ex-
pressed by the system of lexical (part of speech) cat-
egories such as N, and their projections such as NP,
and pure semantics, expressed by their conceptual
representations. The manner these two factors com-
bine is not transparent, we hope to address the issue
in a follow-on paper.
4 One Reality
Let us return to the question posed above concern-
ing ‘real’ meanings: the challenge is not so much
to encode meanings into some clever abstract lan-
guage but to actually account for their successful use
in conversation. If we believe in a common reality
about which we talk to each other, meanings have
to have a property that allows them to be merged in
57
a particular way: anything that is true of the world
must be compatible with anything else that is true.
Yet, reality is not given to us in one fell swoop but
rather needs to be explored. Despite the fact that we
think of the one real model as the justification of our
way of talking, we can only hypostatise its existence
and take it from there. The constructed models of re-
ality must form a family of models each approaching
the single one. This can be explored in two ways.
One way is to insist that any language – even an ab-
stract one – is already equipped with a realist inter-
pretation, and that leads to what is known as Robin-
son Consistency and the so-called Joint Embedding
Property. The second approach considers only the
constructed models as given and constructs reality
out of them. This leads us to inverse systems of
models, or dually, direct systems of algebras.
The models of choice, we argue here, are ACR
representations, in essence graphs with colored
edges. Some additional markup may be neces-
sary on the nodes (to govern the loci of substi-
tution/adjunction operations) and some additional
constraints (in particular limiting out-degrees) may
hold, but on the whole such structures are well un-
derstood. CVS models may stand in various rela-
tions to one another, in a manner far more complex
than the alternative relations familiar from Kripke-
style models. For example, embeddings Ip and Iq
created from the same raw data by PCA but keeping
a different number of dimensions p < q are in an
extension of relation which we can state directly on
the corresponding models as Mp < Mq where <
means ‘can be embedded in’.
In ACR, there are many cases when one model
structure can be embedded in the other, central
among these being the case of the smaller struc-
ture simply containing fewer existents than the larger
one. (The term ‘existent’ is a bit awkward, but helps
to avoid non-Meinongian ontological commitments:
in a model whose base elements are graphs or vec-
tors corresponding to mountain and gold, I(gold)⊗
I(mountain) is an ‘existent’.) Moreover, if K,L
are isomorphic substructures of M, the isomorphy
between K and L can be extended to an automor-
phism ofM, making model structures homogeneous
in the sense of Fraı¨sse´ (1954).
For the graph structures to actually be models they
must satisfy certain requirements. The requirements
are sine qua non because the models are models of
something, namely, in first approximation, external
reality. If models are about external reality then it
follows that there can be only one. As such how-
ever it is not to be found in anyone’s head. Instead,
we picture the acquisition of the model structure as
a process that walks through a number of smaller
model structures, expanding them as new informa-
tion comes in. The process of expansion by neces-
sity produces substructures of one bigger structure.
Thus, the classes of model structures must satisfy
what is known as the amalgamation property that for
eachK,L,M where we have k and l embeddings of
M into K and L respectively, we have some N and
embeddings k′ and l′ of K and L into N such that
the following diagram commutes:
N
K
k′
>>
L
l′
``
M
k
``
l
>>
On the logical side we expect a joint consistency
in the spirit of Robinson’ theorem: if T1 and T2 are
two theories such that the intersection is consistent
and there is no formula ϕ such that T1 ` ϕ while
T2 ` ¬ϕ, then T1 ∪ T2 is consistent. Assuming that
the world is consistent, we expect this behaviour.
Let U be the intersection of T1 and T2. Suppose
our database is U . Then after some steps of learning
we may end up in T1 or in T2. However, both states
cannot be in conflict by deriving one of them a for-
mula and the other its negation. So, they are jointly
consistent.
This property makes perfect sense for lexical entries,
where extending a model M with new entries to
build K or L can be amalgamated to produce N .
What this means, in naive terms, is that the lexicon
harbors no contradictions. To see that this is already
a non-empty requirement, consider the lexical en-
try for cancer which will, under the ACR theory,
contain an IS A link to incurable. When (hopefully
soon) a cure is found, this means that the lexical en-
try itself will have to be revised, just as gay marriage
forced the revision of ‘between a man and a woman’.
More significant are the contradictory cases, for in-
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stance when in one extension we learn that Colonel
Mustard killed Mr. Boddy, and in another we learn
that Professor Plum did. Admitting model structures
that harbor internal contradictions (as in paraconsis-
tent logic) clashes with the use of a single model; an
alternative that suggests itself is to allow for much
richer embeddings, e.g. ones that contain propo-
sitional attitude clauses: Miss Scarlet believes that
Colonel Mustard killed Mr. Boddy, while Mrs. Pea-
cock believes it’s Professor Plum.
As the last example shows, there is an additional
complicating factor at play. Even if we assume the
model to be a model of a single reality, this ground-
ing model may vary from person to person as in the
‘lifelong’ DRT of (Alberti, 2000). Communication
may reveal that this is the case, but the remedy is not
simple. Differences may arise about facts of the mat-
ter as well as over meanings, hence they may con-
cern either the grounding model itself (‘reality’) or
the map g that grounds the meanings (Kracht, 2011).
Thus, the fact that language is shared among a group
of individuals in and of itself calls for a different ap-
proach in model theory. This must be left for another
occasion, however.
If we believe in a single and unique model struc-
ture, we will assume that any model we build must
be embeddable into the one existing model. Thus,
we must have the joint embedding property (JEP)
for the family of ‘candidate’ models of reality. This
property requires that for any two models K,L the
existence of an N in which both can be embedded.
Such a consistency requirement must be made if we
insist that all semantics is about a single external re-
ality.
However, suppose the real model is unknown, even
unknowable. Then, if we want to understand what
it means to talk about real objects appeal to external
reality is futile if all we have is appearances. This is
where Kant saw the need of a logic he called tran-
scendental. The transcendental object is so to speak
the limit of approximation made by our inquiry. It
is our construction of reality, which rationalises our
previous models as being about something. In this
connection it is rather interesting to note the pro-
posal by Achourioti and van Lambalgen (2011) con-
cerning the transcendental logic. The authors pro-
pose that what Kant had actually in mind was what
is nowadays called an inverse system. This is a fam-
ily of models Ms indexed by a poset (S,≤) such
that for all s, t there is r such that s, t ≤ r, together
with maps hst : Ms → Mt for s ≥ t satisfying
htr ◦ hst = hsr. Even if there is no unique model
structure, the system of model structures itself is ob-
jective in Kant’s sense (that is about an object) if it
has the structure of an inverse system; and the tran-
scendental object itself can somehow be imagined as
a member of the inverse limit of that system. What
is interesting to note is that the formulae for which
the transition from the inverse system to the inverse
limit is what is known as geometrical formulae, hav-
ing the form ∀x(ϕ(x)→ ∃yθ(x, y)).
5 Conclusions
As usual, model theory does not solve many out-
standing problems, but brings a great deal of much
needed clarity in organizing the minor variants one
could conceive of. As long as we stay with a purely
deductive apparatus, we have to figure out whether
natural deduction, Beth tableaux, Hilbert systems,
sequent calculi, or some new combination of the
above is what we use, and this inevitably gets mixed
up with other design choices we have within the
ACR/CVS world. (Also, for reasons shrouded in the
mists of history, proof theory somehow has a very
bad reputation within linguistics.)
This paper has taken the first, rather tentative
steps towards understanding the structure of the new
model structures. We have seen that operations of
inflectional morphology, whether realized by actual
inflection or by function words, amount to a shift by
a constant vector. Second, we have seen that data
can be pooled across semantically equivalent but
syntactically different constructions such as the of
and ’s possessives. Third, we have seen that the nu-
merical limitations of the current model make it im-
possible to explore the low frequency tail of the dis-
tribution where many phenomena of great linguis-
tic interest, such as causativization and other forms
of predicate decomposition, are to be found. Even
so, our results in Table 1 make clear that the ac-
tual complexity of construction operations is consid-
erably less than the POS-pair assumption built into
CVGs would suggest.
The use of existents provides, for the first time we
59
believe, a reasonable framework to approach both
standard and Meinongian ontology on equal foot-
ing. This is not to say that one has to be committed
to some higher plane of ideal existence where the
entirety of Meinong’s Jungle is present, to the con-
trary, all one needs is a notion of finitely generated
models, and a compositional semantics that is will-
ing to interpret a⊗ b based on the interpretation of a
and b. Similarly, the key property of Fraı¨sse´ homo-
geneity is the one at stake in the entire philosoph-
ical debate surrounding inverted qualia (see Byrne
(2014) for a summary). What is clear is that auto-
morphisms mapping one synonym on another can
be extended to automorphisms of the whole lexicon,
but from here on one may take several paths depend-
ing on one’s philosophical predilections.
Many questions remain open, and perhaps more
importantly, many questions can be meaningfully
asked for the first time. The traditional riddle
of class meanings (how nouns designate ‘things’,
adjectives ‘qualities’, and verbs ‘actions’) is now
amenable to empirical work relating the vectors of
pronouns, proadjectives and other pro-forms to the
center of gravity of 〈N〉, 〈A〉, . . .. On the pure se-
mantics side, we may begin to see how, by finite
mechanism, humans are capable of infinite compre-
hension, learning of (transcendental) objects.
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